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Abstract:   
Whereas recent studies on revolving lines of credit suggest a positive relationship 
between exposure at default and default probability on the line, this paper considers the 
relationship between two financial instruments through the simultaneous analysis of 
credit line utilization and default probability on a personal loan. We model both financial 
instruments endogenously in a simultaneous equation system and find strong evidence 
of a positive relationship between the two instruments. Individuals in the default state 
use their credit line 59% more than those in the non-default state, and full utilization of 
the credit line increases the default probability on the loan by 46% when compared with 
non-utilization. Our results suggest that banks should manage both financial instruments 
simultaneously. 
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Is there any dependence between consumer credit line utilization 
and default probability on a term loan? 
Evidence from bank-level data 
 
Consumer finance has been neglected for many years in the economics and finance literature 
(Campbell, 2006; Campbell et al. 2010; Tufano, 2009), but the recent financial crisis clearly 
shows that consumer financial services are not well managed, and deserve further study. New 
revolving credit instruments have been made available to consumers during the past decades; 
their utilization has grown tremendously in recent years. For example, the Canadian consumer 
credit line market expanded by 133% from 1999 to 2005. Currently, its value far surpasses that 
of credit card debt and personal loans combined. In the United States, outstanding total revolving 
consumer credit, including credit card balances, represents 33% of total consumer debt in 2011. 
The presence of these relatively new and popular credit instruments should have a significant 
impact on consumer financial distress, and may affect conventional credit instruments such as 
term loans. 
The dataset used in this study comes from a leading Canadian bank, and is composed of retail 
borrowers at the institution. We focus on individuals who use both a revolving line of credit 
(credit line hereafter) and a term loan. The two dependent variables of interest are the percentage 
of the credit line drawn down relative to the commitment amount of the bank and the default 
state of the term loan. Early signs of high revolving credit utilization may signal future financial 
distress, reflected by a higher default probability on the term loan. In this original dataset, most 
credit lines are granted upon credit evaluation without strict collateral requirement. The 
revolving line is featured as an add-on to the checking account, allowing the borrower to use the 
funds up to the authorized limit. The lines are mostly unsecured, contrasting with home equity 
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lines of credit (HELOC), another popular revolving credit instrument, which requires home 
equity as collateral. The credit lines we study share some similarities with credit cards, but differ 
with respect to their repayment schedule and their much lower interest rates. The term loans in 
the dataset are also granted upon credit approval, and are not necessarily subject to 
collateralization. Both credit instruments should be viewed as consumption credit, in contrast 
with mortgage-linked or home equity credit. 
We analyze both dependent variables in a simultaneous equation model in which credit line 
utilization is modeled by an instrumented Tobit, and default probability on the loan is modeled 
by an instrumented Probit. Our assumptions are that both variables are endogenous and that their 
relationship is positive. Excessive credit line utilization may signal bad liquidity shocks, 
ultimately affecting the borrower’s default probability on their term loan. Conversely, a high 
default probability on the term loan may lead borrowers to use the liquidity made available by 
the line excessively, in the hope of reducing the impact of financial distress. Banks interpret such 
behavior as a signal of credit quality deterioration: this may lead to better risk management of the 
loan portfolio if corrective measures are taken early.  
To deal with the endogeneity problem of the system of equations, we instrument the credit line 
utilization and the default probability variables. Our results show that exposure at default (EAD), 
modeled by credit line utilization, is endogenous in the default probability equation of the term 
loan. Further, the default probability variable is endogenous in the credit line utilization equation. 
We use valid instruments to overcome the endogeneity problem and to successfully estimate 
both equations. We find a positive relationship between the two variables, and we verify that the 
number of active credit lines plays a significant role in the borrower’s probability of default on 
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the term loan. We also propose a new measure of debtholder ability to pay back the loan, which 
complements the credit score variable, to explain the default probability and the credit line 
utilization. With the proposed specification, the borrower’s ability to pay significantly affects 
credit line utilization--those with the worst ability to pay are more likely to default on the term 
loan.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to highlight the link between revolving credit 
utilization and the default probability on a different instrument for consumers. Because a default 
on the term loan may ultimately degenerate into borrower default, banks should carefully 
manage the interactions between a borrower’s credit instruments. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 1 presents a brief definition of consumer 
lines of credit. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and explains how this study complements 
it. We depart from what has been done previously by analyzing two different credit instruments 
simultaneously and controlling for endogeneity. Section 3 presents some general statistics from 
the Canadian and US markets. The variables used and the dataset are specified in Section 4. The 
descriptive statistics of the sample are covered in Section 5, while Section 6 provides the 
hypotheses and methodology. Results are presented in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes the 
paper. 
1. General definition of revolving lines of credit 
In its most general definition, a line of credit is the maximum amount a bank commits to grant a 
borrower for a predetermined period of time. Borrowers who are accepted can use (i.e. borrow 
and repay) funds up to the maximal amount authorized on the credit line. Two types of lines of 
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credit are usually available to consumers: credit cards and revolving lines of credit. One of the 
main differences between these two instruments is that credit cards usually require no collateral 
from the client, making them unsecured loans for the institution, whereas credit lines are 
sometimes secured by collateral. Credit lines are also characterized by a lower interest rate. 
Some credit lines are secured by the equity owned on a house; they are called Home Equity 
Lines of Credit (HELOC). However, not every credit line is backed by collateral. For small 
consumer lines of credit, banks usually require a less valuable asset as collateral or no collateral 
at all, relying solely on the borrower’s credit evaluation for the acceptance decision.  
Our dataset differs from what has been widely used in the existing literature because it does not 
include HELOC or credit cards; upon credit approval applicants are granted a revolving line of 
credit, attached to their checking accounts. For consumers in our sample, a line of credit usually 
has no maturity; the bank renews the account periodically as long as it remains active. A 
minimum monthly payment of 3% of the balance is usually required to keep the line active. The 
interest charges are added to the amount drawn down by the borrower, and if a client reaches the 
borrowing limit on the line, the institution can renegotiate the contract into a term loan on which 
interest and capital must be repaid monthly. However, even upon reaching the borrowing limit, 
the credit line may remain active if the borrower keeps making the minimum required payments . 
2. Literature review 
The relevant literature for our study covers both corporate and personal revolving credit 
analyses. Although some findings are similar in nature, one must be careful when making 
inferences from the corporate literature to the consumer literature. Recent studies suggest a 
positive relationship between exposure at default (EAD) and default probability (D) on lines of 
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credit. For example, looking at HELOC, Agarwal et al. (2006a) find that consumers with an ex 
ante higher expectation of credit deterioration use a smaller part of their line of credit at 
origination. Their findings also suggest that the drawing behavior after origination is inversely 
related to changes in the borrower’s credit quality. This is reflected by higher credit line 
utilization for borrowers who end up defaulting on the line, and implies that the exposure at 
default should not be treated independently from the default probability on the credit line. The 
authors do not calculate the default hazards because not enough borrowers are in default in their 
sample. We do not have access to such a panel dataset, but we match credit line utilization to 
default probability on a different credit instrument, and we extend the analysis to address 
endogeneity. 
Studying corporate lines of credit, Jiménez et al. (2009) find similar results and evidence of a 
positive relationship between the probability of default and the amount drawn by a firm on its 
credit line. This relationship is strongest near the default event. Such findings show a quality 
reduction in the credit line market; consumers with deteriorating credit quality are the ones who 
use their credit lines the most.  
Agarwal et al. (2006b) study the differences between the actions individuals take on Home 
Equity Loans and HELOC. They find that users of these two instruments exhibit differing risk 
profiles. Their sample shows that borrowers using a term loan have a lower credit rating and 
contract significantly smaller amounts than individuals using a line of credit. They also assert 
that the probability of prepayment is higher on lines of credit than on term loans. Their analysis 
shows that the probability of default on credit lines is lower than on term loans, the latter being 
more sensitive to changes in the value of the home and twice as sensitive to changes in interest 
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rates. Because borrowers usually have either a HELOC or a Home Equity Loan, they do not 
highlight the potential link between this revolving credit instrument and a loan, as we do in a 
different context. Our analysis is possible because our sample consists of consumers’ credit 
activities at the institution; it is not unlikely for borrowers to use both a revolving credit line and 
a term loan in this context. 
Calem et al. (2011) perform panel data estimation and risk hazard analysis on HELOC borrower 
data to test for an adverse selection effect in the credit line market. They find that contrary to 
neoclassical theories of consumption, tightening economic conditions are associated with a 
negative shift in the credit quality of the borrower pool. Further analysis shows that drawdowns 
when the anticipation of future income is low are associated with a higher probability of 
borrower delinquency. Such evidence is consistent with an adverse selection problem in the 
market. We do not consider macroeconomic factors in the analysis because we use a cross-
sectional dataset. We model the differences across borrowers instead of the differences across 
time. 
Dey (2005) studied consumers’ decision to incur debt through a credit card rather than through a 
personal line of credit. He finds that theoretically, the collateral required on a line of credit can 
make consumers reluctant to use the full loan amount authorized by the bank. Depending on their 
utility function and corresponding risk aversion, agents may prefer to use an unsecured credit 
card, even if it bears a higher interest rate. This explains why some people carry a positive 
balance on their credit cards even though their credit line is not maxed out. 
Studying the credit card market, Dunn and Kim (1999) find evidence that variables such as the 
ratio of minimum required payment on the card, the percentage of the line used and the number 
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of cards on which the borrower has reached the limit have a highly significant impact on the 
default probability. They argue that these variables represent a short-term assessment of the 
default probability, and may replace the usual debt-to-income ratio used in most research on 
default probability determinants. Their data come from an original survey but do not directly 
include bank-level data. Like them, we consider the number of credit lines a borrower has 
contracted in our default probability equation. 
Norden and Weber (2010) investigate checking accounts and the information they supply 
regarding credit line utilization for both firms and consumers. Using a German dataset, they 
show that banks tend to monitor clients’ credit line utilization through information on the use of 
their checking accounts. Although there are many similarities between personal and corporate 
lines of credit, some differences are worth noting. Empirical evidence shows that firms often 
refinance their lines of credit as term loans before the maximum amount authorized is used, 
possibly to preserve their short-term borrowing capacity (Agarwal et al., 2004). This happens 
because firms pay a percentage fee according to the unused portion of their line, whereas 
consumers do not. Only corporate credit lines are subject to material adverse change (MAC) 
clauses (Agarwal et al., 2006a). At one specific institution examined, the bank has full 
commitment on the authorized amount on the credit line during its active period. 
Using a Canadian dataset, Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2007) find that monitoring firms’ 
transaction accounts may provide useful information on borrower credit quality. They show that 
banks intensify the transaction account monitoring activity when loans are perceived as 
deteriorating. They argue that such monitoring helps the lender gather information about the 
borrowing firm’s accounts receivable and inventories. In our sample, credit lines are attached to 
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the consumer’s checking account. Monitoring credit line utilization for consumers can 
potentially provide information about borrowers’ short-term credit quality, as will be shown 
below. 
Strahan (1999), who studied the corporate credit market, argues that liquidity needs and default 
probability are interrelated, the former being higher when financing from other sources is harder 
to obtain, usually because the borrower’s default risk is above average. He also notes that a 
typical deal between a firm and its bank should include both a term loan and a credit line. 
Combining both short-term and long-term borrowing would help an institution divide monitoring 
costs between these two loans. It can thus gain a better understanding of the borrower’s credit 
quality. Information on both credit instruments should be combined so that credit line drawdown 
behavior can be connected to the default risk assessment of a term loan and vice versa. We 
pursue this idea empirically for individual borrowers. 
3. Statistics on credit lines 
Of all household financial products, lines of credit have grown the most in recent years. The 
Statistics Canada 2005 Survey of Financial Security reports that credit lines accounted for 9.0% 
of total Canadian household debt in 2005, versus 5.7% in 1999. This increase represents a 
change of 133.2% in constant 2005 dollars. At that time, personal credit lines were the most 
prevalent type of debt after real estate mortgages, which accounted for 75.3% of total Canadian 
household debt. According to this study, the total amount of debt on credit cards and installment 
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credit1 has risen by 58.4% (to 3.4% of total family unit debt in 2005) during the same period, the 
second largest increase after that of credit lines.  
These numbers are consistent with an upward trend in consumer lines of credit, which started in 
the 1990s. Figure 1 presents the assets of Canadian chartered banks used for consumer credit, 
excluding mortgages for the period of November 1981 to March 2012. 2  During that time, the 
proportion allocated to personal loans did not increase as much as that allocated to lines of credit 
and credit cards. Since 1997, the total value of lines of credit has increased dramatically, far 
exceeding the total value of personal loans. In March 2012, the portion of assets dedicated to 
personal lines of credit was the largest, almost twice the value of credit card and personal loans 
combined. This suggests that the proportion of credit line debt used by households is now even 
higher than what is reported by the Statistics Canada 2005 study.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Further, personal revolving credit utilization has risen sharply in the US since the mid-1990s. 
The latest numbers provided by the Federal Reserve3 (FBR: G.19) show that in March 2012, 
outstanding revolving credit for consumers totaled $803.6 billion, representing 31.61% of the 
total outstanding consumer debt. This number represents all types of revolving consumer credit. 
The significant increase in revolving credit usage warrants the inclusion of these instruments in 
economic and financial models to fully understand the evolution in households’ consumption 
decisions (Dey, 2005). 
                                                          
1 From Statistics Canada: “Instalment debt is the total amount owing on deferred payment or instalment plans where 
the purchased item is to be paid for over a period of time.” 
2 Source: Series v36867, v36868 and v36869 of CANSIM. 
3 Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19, available online: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/g19.htm. 
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4. Variables Used and Dataset 
Table 1 presents the variables used in the analysis; they can be divided into three categories: 
(a) Variables that affect both the credit line utilization and the default probability on the loan 
(b) Variables used as instruments for credit line utilization 
(c) Variables used as instruments for the default probability  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.1 Explanatory variables 
To control for the characteristics of borrowers in the sample, we include information about their 
sex, credit score, seniority at the bank, working situation, number of dependents, age, and ability-
to-pay. The credit score is the one calculated by the institution when the borrower applied for 
credit. It ranges from 1 to 8, with lower values indicating a better credit quality. We develop an 
ability-to-pay variable to take into account borrowers’ income and expenditures, which can have 
economic significance beyond the information provided by the credit score. Some authors have 
argued that the information collected by financial institutions on potential individual borrowers is 
not always accurate (see, for example, Finlay, 2006).  Specifically, the information concerning 
expenditures would be the most problematic because borrowers have incentives to misreport, and 
such information is hardly verifiable by the bank. We suspect that this is the case in our sample:  
the mean monthly expenditures reported is $247.39. This does not seem realistic because this 
amount putatively includes rent and all other personal expenses. Following the methodology 
used by Finlay (2006) for the United Kingdom, we estimate these expenses based on a larger 
dataset compiled by Statistics Canada. By taking into account variables such as sex, age, income, 
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type of housing and dependents in an ordinary least squares estimation, we rigorously associate 
expenditures with each borrower in our sample and construct the ability-to-pay ratio. Results of 
the estimation used for predicting expenditures in our sample are presented in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We then develop a ratio that measures borrowers’ financial constraints. The definition proposed 
for the ability-to-pay variable is the ratio of the monthly payment on the loan to the borrower’s 
capacity to pay (expressed as income plus tangible assets minus expenditures). Income and 
expenditures are expressed in monthly amounts, and the tangible assets are divided by the 
remaining months on the loan contract to fit the time frame. This allows us to capture a short-
term assessment of the ability-to-pay. The ratio is expressed as: 
 Ability	̵to	̵pay	ratio	 ൌ 	 ெ௢௡௧௛௟௬	௣௔௬௠௘௡௧	௢௡	௧௛௘	௟௢௔௡ூ௡௖௢௠௘ା௧௔௡௚௜௕௟௘	௔௦௦௘௧௦ି௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘௦ (3) 
A negative value for this ratio implies that the expenditures are higher than the income and 
tangible assets added, while a value of more than one implies a monthly payment higher than the 
customer’s ability to pay. More prudent borrowers have a small but positive ratio.  
This ratio has been segmented in different categories to better determine the point at which it 
becomes economically significant. The segmentation is presented in Table 3. Category 5 is taken 
as the reference category in the next estimations; it corresponds to the category of borrowers 
with the best ability-to-pay. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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4.2 Instrumental variables 
To overcome the endogeneity bias of the model, we use statistically valid instruments for the 
default probability and the credit line utilization ratio. As in all studies using instrumental 
variables, the dataset dictates the choice of instruments. The instrument sets have been validated 
by an Amemiya-Lee-Newey overidentification test.  
To instrument the default probability variable, we use the remainder term of the loan expressed 
in months, the number of active credit lines, and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
loan is secured by collateral. While these variables should be correlated to the default probability 
conditionally on all other exogenous variables of the model, neither instrumental variable should 
be correlated to credit line utilization. To instrument the credit line utilization variable, we use 
the amount drawn on the line and a dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of 
collateral on the credit line. In this case, the instruments should be correlated to the credit line 
utilization conditionally on all other exogenous variables of the model, and should not be 
correlated to the default probability. 
4.3 Dataset 
The dataset we use is original; it has been granted by a leading Canadian financial institution. It 
consists of a random sample of 37,440 observations of the institution’s borrowers with 
information ranging from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007. There is no reason to believe 
that poorly performing accounts were eliminated from the sample because we observe cases of 
borrowers with as many as 43 cumulative late payments on the loan. After eliminating duplicates 
and observations for which information is missing, we obtain a full sample of 34,404 
observations on borrowers.  
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We are interested in individuals using both a credit line and a term loan; they represent 43% of 
the full sample. We retain only those borrowers using both credit instruments; we thus perform 
our analysis on a cross-sectional dataset of 14,767 observations at December 31, 2007. At the 
time of extraction, the bank considered 160 clients to be in default on the term loan (i.e., more 
than three consecutive monthly nonpayments), a proportion of 1.08% of the database. The 
extraction date paints a portrait of Canadian households when the financial crisis was already 
well under way, although the crisis did not affect the Canadian banking system significantly.  
Because people who apply for a revolving line of credit face an acceptance or rejection decision 
made by the bank’s credit department, our selection procedure to keep borrowers using both a 
revolving line of credit and a term loan might entail a bias towards more creditworthy borrowers. 
To control for such potential bias, we estimate a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) and 
test for the statistical significance of the inverse Mills ratio. To do so, we first model the 
variables influencing the likelihood of a borrower’s using a line of credit in a Probit regression 
where the dependent variable is the binary variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a line of credit, 
and 0 otherwise. As previously shown, consistency of the estimates requires a linear regression 
model to be used in the second step estimation of the credit line utilization and default 
probability equations. For this reason, we follow the procedure featured in Wooldridge (2002) 
for the case of an endogenous independent variable. We use a Two-Stage Least Squares 
technique to test the statistical significance of the inverse Mills ratio in the second step of the 
Heckman procedure for both equations. We also carefully use exclusion restrictions to avoid 
perfect correlation of the inverse Mills ratio in the second step estimation. For example, total 
debt is used in the selection equation but not in the outcome equation, while the ability-to-pay 
ratios are used only in the outcome equation. The results for the selection equation are presented 
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in Table 4. From these results, we calculate predicted probabilities and use them in the inverse 
Mills ratio. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 shows that the inverse Mills ratio is not statistically significant at the 10% confidence 
level in either the credit line utilization or default probability equations. The two sets of 
estimation results are very similar for each equation, showing that the inverse Mills ratio does 
not affect significantly the results.  This implies that we can pursue our analysis without 
considering any sample selection bias.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5. Descriptive statistics 
The data we use cover information the bank acquired when it originally accepted the customers. 
The mean (median) amount authorized on the credit lines is $5,037.19 ($5,000) and the mean 
(median) value of the term loans is $14,125.86 ($12,878.79). No instruments in the sample are 
used over the authorized limit. This means the bank most likely applies mechanisms to prevent 
overdrafts on the credit line. The financial instruments that compose our sample are not tied to 
the equity on the borrower’s home, and should be considered consumption credit. One important 
contrast with the loans that make up our dataset and the usual HELOC or Home Equity Loans 
concerns collateralization. For example, only 4.26% of the credit lines that make up our dataset 
are secured by collateral, compared with about 23.82% of term loans. The bank relies on the 
applicant’s credit history to decide whether or not to grant the line of credit. Although the 
institution issues only one credit line per customer, we introduce a variable indicating how many 
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more credit lines are active for the customer at other institutions. No other information on the 
additional lines is available, which makes it hard to assess external limits on the borrower’s 
available credit at other institutions. This may nonetheless serve as a proxy for consumers’ 
number of bank relationships. 
Table 6 provides further information on the composition of the sample. Slightly more than one 
percent of observations are considered in default on the term loan. Because the default state is a 
binary variable, we use the Probit model to estimate its probability. The table also presents the 
proportion of individuals with zero and total credit line usage, and the proportion of observations 
lying between these two extremes. This distribution justifies the Tobit modeling of the credit line 
utilization variable, although some authors have also used OLS estimation (e.g. Agarwal et al., 
2006a; Jiménez et al., 2009b), as we also report. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 7 shows the individuals at corner solutions of credit line utilization as a proportion of the 
loan status. 38.75% of the observations for which the loan is considered in default use their entire 
credit line. Only 3.96% of the observations in the non-default group have reached such 
utilization. The extreme cases in the sample are thus in line with our hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 presents the mean and median of each variable, depending on whether the loan is in 
default or not. We test whether these statistics are significantly different across the default and 
non-default groups. The mean (median) credit line utilization is 78% (99%) for the default group 
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compared with 45% (43%) for the non-default group. These numbers are in line with our 
hypothesis. In our sample, the higher the credit score, the riskier the borrower is considered by 
the institution. This is reflected across both groups; the means and medians are statistically 
different. Regarding the borrower’s age and seniority at the institution, the median test shows 
that defaulters are both significantly younger and have a shorter business relationship with the 
bank. The control variables of number of dependents, sex and work indicators are not statistically 
different across both groups. For the non-segmented ability-to-pay ratio, the difference across 
both groups is statistically significant for the median, but not for the mean. Borrowers with the 
worst ability-to-pay are more likely to be in the default group.  Individuals facing default on the 
term loan have a shorter median of remaining term on their loans, while the number of active 
lines of credit is not statistically different between both groups. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
6. Hypotheses and methodology 
Research on credit line utilization has mainly focused on the relationship between borrowers’ 
drawdown behavior and the default probability associated with their credit line. The literature 
generally suggests a positive relationship between drawdown and the default state; lines that end 
up in default are usually the ones that were used the most.4 This has significant implications for 
the calculation of the EAD on the line because the relationship with the default probability must 
be taken into account.5  
                                                          
4 See Agarwal et al., 2006a, Jiménez et al., 2009b, and Norden and Weber, 2010. 
5 See, for example, Jiménez et al. (2009a). 
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In contrast, the main hypothesis of our study concerns the relationship between credit line 
utilization and default probability on a term loan. Due to limited data, we could not perform a 
dynamic analysis of the two variables. Instead, we analyze the link between the level of credit 
line utilization and the default probability on the term loan with a cross-sectional dataset of 
borrowers. Our hypotheses are that both variables are endogenous, and that the relationship 
between them is positive. Specifically, when borrowers face financial distress and an increase in 
the default probability on the term loan, they may apply to the liquidity made available by the 
credit line toward the monthly payments on their term loans. Because the repayment schedule of 
the loan is tighter than that of the credit line, it may be to the borrowers’ advantage to use the 
maximum amount available on their credit line to avoid default on the term loan. A higher 
default probability on the loan may thus result in more aggressive revolving credit utilization. 
Conversely, when borrowers experience bad liquidity shocks, the credit line is the first 
instrument on which they might be tempted to draw. Such abnormal liquidity shocks are 
reflected by higher credit line utilization, and may ultimately lead to financial distress, as 
reflected by a higher default probability on the term loan. For these reasons, we conjecture that 
both variables are endogenous and that the relationship between them is positive.  
To consider the endogeneity of the dependent variables, we build a simultaneous equation model 
in which one equation represents the default probability on the loan and the other represents the 
percentage use of the credit line. The bank monitors the monthly non-payments by borrowers on 
their term loan; after more than 90 consecutive days late they are considered to be in default on 
the loan. We establish the default state on the loan with a variable provided by the financial 
institution. A loan classified as "bad" in the database is presumed to be in default. This rating is 
the worst the institution can attribute to a customer. It reflects more than three consecutive 
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monthly late payments on the loan. Credit line utilization is calculated as the ratio of the amount 
drawn down on the line on the extraction date divided by the maximum amount allowed.  
Neither dependent variable can be assumed to follow the normal distribution, because the default 
probability is a dichotomous variable and the credit line utilization is bounded by zero and one 
(respectively usage rates of 0% and 100% of the line). With these specifications, the former 
variable is modeled by an instrumental Probit equation (1) and the latter variable by an 
instrumental Tobit equation (2). The model can be represented by the following system: 
 ݕଵ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚଵݕଶ ൅ ࢠሺ૚ሻ	ߜሺଵሻ ൅ ݑଵ			  (1) 
 ݕଶ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߚଶݕଵ ൅	ࢠሺ૛ሻߜሺଶሻ ൅ ݑଶ.	  (2) 
In such a system, the two endogenous variables are ݕଵ, the default probability on the term loan, 
and ݕଶ, the percentage of the line drawn down. The vectors ࢠሺ࢏ሻ of explanatory variables and ߜሺ௜ሻ 
of parameters are used for the exogenous factors of the model. Variables ݑଵ	and	ݑଶ	are the 
random error terms for equations (1) and (2) respectively. 
We estimate three sets of results for this system (see Table 9). The first set of results is estimated 
with Newey’s Two-Step Efficient Estimator (Newey, 1987), a limited information procedure. 
Standard errors for this estimator are based on Amemiya’s (1978, 1979) derivations of the 
efficient variance-covariance matrices. We thus validate the chosen instruments for each 
endogenous variable by an Amemiya-Lee-Newey overidentification test (Lee, 1992). The second 
set is estimated from a full information maximum likelihood procedure and provides a simple 
Wald test of the exogeneity of an explanatory variable. It allows us to test the endogeneity of the 
default probability and the credit line utilization variables. For robustness, the last set of results is 
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a joint two-step estimation of OLS and Probit models, known as Two-Step Probit Least Squares 
(2SPLS). All procedures are instrumented for the endogenous variables of the system.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
7. Estimation results 
The second stage results of these three estimations are qualitatively identical, and are presented 
in Table 9. We derive the marginal effects in Table 10 from the full information maximum 
likelihood procedure, which is the preferred set of results. 
7.1 Endogeneity-Related Tests 
Our first hypothesis about the relationship between credit line utilization and default probability 
on a term loan is that both variables are endogenous. To test this hypothesis, we perform a Wald 
test after the maximum likelihood estimation. Results, presented in Table 10, show that for both 
equations, the exogeneity hypothesis is rejected and each variable is considered endogenous in 
the equation for which it is used. To test the validity of the instruments, we use the Amemiya-
Lee-Newey overidentification test available after the minimum chi-square estimation. This test 
concludes that both instrument sets are valid, and confirms that we have eliminated the 
endogeneity bias in the system. The result of this test is also presented in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
7.2 Marginal Effects 
We present the marginal effects at the average of the explanatory variables for the model 
obtained from the maximum likelihood estimation, to capture the conditional effects. For each of 
the equations studied, it is possible to derive different marginal effects. We retain the marginal 
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effects of the linear prediction for the probability of default equation, and the marginal effects of 
the latent variable for the credit line utilization equation; they are presented in Table 10. Table 11 
illustrates the Tobit decomposition according to McDonald and Moffitt (1980) for the credit line 
utilization equation. 
7.3 Default Probability Equation 
The credit line utilization variable is highly significant in the default probability equation, and is 
quantitatively the most important factor affecting default probability. The result suggests that  
higher utilization of the credit line has a statistically significant impact on increasing the 
likelihood of default on a term loan. This confirms our hypothesis and shows that it is important 
for financial institutions to assess consumer default probabilities jointly with the use of various 
financial instruments. This variable is even more economically significant than the credit score 
assigned by the financial institution. The use of a line of credit is hence a potential signal of the 
default probability of a consumer term loan. The marginal effect of this variable on the 
probability of default on the term loan is approximately 46%. The interpretation is that borrowers 
who go from 0% to 100% utilization of the credit line experience a 46% increase in their default 
probability on the term loan, everything else held constant. Alternatively, at the sample average, 
a 1% increase in use of the line causes an increase of 46 percentage points in the default 
probability. 
The credit score is also highly significant and positive. It shows that the bank has successfully 
managed to classify customers according to the risk they present. Obviously, a riskier consumer 
has a higher probability of default. However, even after controlling for the credit score, credit 
line utilization is still an important determinant of default probability. 
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The first two categories of the ability-to-pay ratio are significant, and show that individuals with 
a lower ability to pay have a higher probability of default. This significance disappears in 
categories 3 and 4, comprising individuals with better financial capacity. This leads us to believe 
that the ability to pay is crucial for the determination of the probability of default on a term loan 
when the borrower is very financially constrained. The economic effect is important. People with 
a very poor ability to pay would therefore send a signal of high probability of default to financial 
institutions, which should use this variable to assess the default risk of their customers as a 
supplement of the credit score information. It indicates, indirectly, that the credit score variable 
is not sufficient to assess default probability. The credit score variable is, in fact, more of a proxy 
for credit delinquency than a measure of the customer’s financial constraints. 
The number of active credit lines is particularly interesting in this equation; it is highly 
significant and its economic impact is very important. The results clearly show that borrowers 
with multiple lines of credit have a higher probability of default on their term loan. The sign of 
this variable implies that individuals with a high number of active lines of credit do not gain 
more liquidity. Instead, each additional credit line increases the default probability by 26.39%. 
We posit that the various lines of credit an individual possesses negatively affect their credit 
quality because they are already heavily drawn down. It would thus be important for financial 
institutions to use this variable in their decision models to monitor borrowers’ credit activity and 
to be kept informed of other credit lines contracted. 
7.4 Credit line utilization equation 
As assumed, the default probability on the term loan is one of the most important determinants of 
credit line utilization. This variable is significant and is quantitatively the most important one in 
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the model. This confirms the hypothesis that increasing the probability of default on a term loan 
leads borrowers to use their lines of credit more aggressively, even when the risk rating assigned 
by the bank is taken into account. The marginal effect of this variable indicates that individuals 
in default on a term loan use their line of credit about 59% more than individuals who are not in 
default. The credit score variable suggests that borrowers who present a higher risk for the bank 
are the ones who use their lines the most.  
As for the borrower’s ability to pay, results show that in comparison to the omitted fifth category 
(the best ability to pay), borrowers with the worst ability to pay are the ones who use their credit 
lines the most. This is very intuitive, because the variable measures the borrower’s financial 
constraints, and thus serves as a measure of short-term liquidity needs that can be met by credit 
line utilization. Our results confirm that borrowers who have difficulty making loan payments 
rely more on the use of their credit line. Further, the effect on credit line utilization for category 4 
(Abil 4) is more than double that of category 1 (Abil 1), emphasizing the fact that borrowers with 
a worse ability-to-pay ratio need to rely more on the liquidity provided by the credit line. 
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decompose the marginal effects for a Tobit model with a lower 
limit into two categories: the intensive margin and the extensive margin. Their analysis can be 
applied to the Tobit model used in this paper. Such decomposition allows an analysis of 
individuals’ drawdown behavior depending on their usage category. It provides insights about 
borrowers who shift from zero (ݕଶ ൌ 0ሻ to moderate ሺ0 ൏ ݕଶ ൏ 1ሻ	or total use ሺݕଶ ൌ 1ሻ of the 
credit line. The unconditional expectation of the dependent variable can be written as: 
ܧሾݕଶሿ ൌ ܲሺݕଶ ൌ 0ሻ ∗ ܧሾݕଶ|ݕଶ ൌ 0ሿ ൅ ܲሺ0 ൏ ݕଶ ൏ 1ሻ ∗ ܧሾݕଶ|0 ൏ ݕଶ ൏ 1ሿ ൅ ܲሺݕଶ ൌ 1ሻ ∗ ܧሾݕଶ|ݕଶ ൌ 1ሿ (4) 
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By taking the derivative with respect to the explanatory variables, we get: 
 డாሾ௬మሿడ௑ೖ ൌ
డ௉ሺ଴ழ௬మழଵሻ
డ௑ೖ ∗ ܧሾݕଶ|0 ൏ ݕଶ ൏ 1ሿ ൅
డாሾ௬మ|଴ழ௬మழଵሿ
డ௑ೖ ∗ ܲሺ0 ൏ ݕଶ ൏ 1ሻ ൅
డ௉ሺ௬మୀଵሻ
డ௑ೖ  (5) 
There are thus three effects to take into account: 1) the extensive margin; 2) the intensive margin; 
and 3) the change in the probability of using 100% of the credit line. We present the extensive 
and intensive margins in Table 11. The statistical significance remains very similar; differences 
come from the estimation of the marginal effects used in the decomposition.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
The important result of the above analysis is that the sign of the default probability variable is 
not the same for the extensive margin as for the intensive margin. Therefore, the default 
probability has a positive impact on the marginal use of a credit line for individuals who already 
have a utilization rate between zero and one. Individuals facing default on the term loan thus 
decide to increase their credit line utilization to meet their liquidity needs. Even in situations of 
financial distress, individuals who already use their credit lines would therefore not hesitate to 
take on more debt to fulfill other financial obligations. However, for individuals who do not use 
their lines of credit or who already use the maximum amount authorized by the bank, the default 
situation has a negative impact on the latent utilization rate. Indeed, the effect of the probability 
of default at the extensive margin is negative. Because the bank has full commitment on the 
amount authorized even if the borrower defaults, we can rule out a supply effect caused by the 
bank cutting off the funds available on the credit line. This shows that individuals who are not 
using their credit lines would be reluctant to start using them in the event of a default on the term 
loan. Perhaps such borrowers do not wish to aggravate their financial situation. This effect, 
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however, also includes individuals who already use the line fully, although their proportion is 
very small in the sample. The marginal effects presented thus confirm the assumption of our 
model and suggest that the situation of default on a term loan affects individuals’ decisions to 
draw on their lines of credit. 
8. Conclusion 
This research studies two credit instruments simultaneously through joint modeling of credit line 
utilization and default probability on a term loan. Research on credit line utilization has generally 
focused on the relationship between the borrower’s drawdown behavior and the default 
probability associated with the line. We innovate by analyzing two financial instruments 
simultaneously and by quantifying the effect of each instrument on the other. The model thus 
highlights the need to evaluate credit risk for a portfolio of financial instruments held by 
borrowers. We estimate a simultaneous equation model in which the default status on the loan is 
modeled by an instrumental Probit equation, whereas the credit line utilization is modeled by an 
instrumental Tobit equation.  
Our main results are that the two independent variables of the model are endogenous and that 
their relationship is positive. We use valid instruments to eliminate the econometric bias and 
affirm that an increased use of the credit line is associated with an increased default probability 
on a term loan, while an increased default probability is associated with increased use of the line. 
The estimated marginal effects indicate that a default status on the term loan is associated with 
an increase of about 59% in credit line utilization. As for the credit line equation, the marginal 
effects show that for individuals moving from 0% to 100% utilization of their credit line, the 
probability of default on the loan increases by approximately 46%. Alternatively, at the sample 
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average, a 1% increase in use of the line causes an increase of 46 percentage points in the default 
probability. We also find that the number of active lines of credit that an individual possesses is 
an important determinant of the likelihood of default on a term loan. The marginal effect of an 
additional line of credit for consumers leads to an increase of 26% in the probability of default. 
We propose a new variable to measure the borrower’s ability to pay. This variable complements 
the credit scoring variable developed by banks and credit agencies, which is more a measure of 
delinquency. Our results indicate that borrowers with the worst ability-to-pay ratios are the most 
likely to default on a term loan and to use their credit lines more extensively. These figures are 
reasonable and reflect the composition of the sample.  
8.1 Policy Implications 
Basel regulation requires banks to set aside a minimum capital reserve to avoid financial 
disasters. Such legislation has been adopted by several countries since 1988 and seeks to protect 
depositors of financial institutions; it is based primarily on portfolio assessment of probabilities 
of default on bank loans. The Committee allows banks to develop an internal method for 
computing the capital to keep in reserve. Once their methodology is accepted, banks can use 
their own estimations of default probabilities, recovery rates, and loss given default. Given the 
results of our analysis, the amount borrowers draw on the credit line (EAD) is likely to be 
correlated with the default probability on the term loan. The inclusion of such a correlation 
should allow banks to manage risk diversification more effectively. Banks could therefore 
manage the borrower’s risks as a portfolio by taking into account the significant dependence 
across the borrower’s various financial obligations. By creating portfolios of loans that allow 
greater diversification, financial institutions could reduce the minimum capital reserve required 
by regulators. 
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8.2 Limits and possible extensions 
Our analysis is limited to the data available. Studies on the use of a line of credit suggest that this 
instrument is positively correlated with changes in the borrower’s creditworthiness over time 
(Agarwal et al., 2006a; Jiménez et al., 2009b; Norden and Weber, 2010). To our knowledge, no 
study on consumer credit has analyzed the temporal relationship between a revolving credit 
instrument and a term loan, as we have done statically. It would thus be interesting to test our 
model in the context of panel data that could address the effects associated with different 
economic cycles. Such an analysis would provide more information on the dynamics of borrower 
behavior and could increase the potential correlation between the two financial instruments. 
Credit card balances could also be incorporated in our framework, if such data were available.
 28 
 
References 
Agarwal, Sumit, Brent W. Ambrose, and Chunlin Liu (2006a). “Credit Lines and Credit 
Utilization.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38(1), 1-22. 
Agarwal, Sumit, Brent W. Ambrose, Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Chunlin Liu (2006b). “An 
Empirical Analysis of Home Equity Loan and Line Performance.” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 15, 444-469. 
Agarwal, Sumit, Souphala Chomsisengphet, and John C. Driscoll (2004). “Loan Commitments 
and Private Firms.” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 2004-27.  
Amemiya, Takeshi (1978). “The Estimation of a Simultaneous Equation Generalized Probit 
Model.” Econometrica 46(5), 1193-1205. 
Amemiya, Takeshi (1979). “The Estimation of a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model.” 
International Economic Review 20(1), 169-181. 
Calem, Paul, Matthew Cannon, and Leonard Nakamura (2011). “Credit Cycle and Adverse 
Selection Effects in Consumer Credit Markets – Evidence from the HELOC Market.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 11-13. 
Campbell, John Y. (2006). “Household Finance.” Journal of Finance 61(4), 1553-1604. 
 29 
 
Campbell, John Y., Howell E. Jackson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Peter Tufano (2010). “The 
Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with Four Case Studies.” 
HKS Working Paper RWP10-40.  
Dey, Shubhasis (2005). “Lines of Credit and Consumption Smoothing: The Choice between 
Credit Cards and Home Equity Lines of Credit.” Bank of Canada Working Paper 2005-18. 
Dubin, Jeffrey A. and Douglas Rivers (1989). “Selection Bias in Linear Regression, Logit and 
Probit Models”. Sociological Methos and Research 18(2&3), 360-390. 
Dunn, Lucia F. and TaeHyung Kim (1999). “An empirical investigation of credit card default.” 
The Ohio State University Working Paper 99-13. 
Finlay, Steven M. (2006). “Predictive models of expenditure and over-indebtedness for assessing 
the affordability of new consumer credit applications.” Journal of the Operational Research 
Society 57, 655–669. 
Heckman, James J. (1979). “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica 
47(1), 153-162. 
Jiménez, Gabriel, Jose A. Lopez, and Jesús Saurina (2009a). “EAD Calibration for Corporate 
Credit Lines.” Federal Reserve Band of San Francisco Working Paper 2009-02. 
Jiménez, Gabriel, Jose A. Lopez, and Jesús Saurina (2009b). “Empirical Analysis of Corporate 
Credit Lines.” The Review of Financial Studies 22(12), 5069-5098. 
 30 
 
Lee, Lung-Fei (1992). “Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squares and Tests of Overidentification in 
Simultaneous Equation Models with Qualitative or Limited Dependent Variables.” Econometric 
Reviews 11(3), 319-328. 
McDonald, John F., and Robert A. Moffitt (1980). “The Uses of Tobit Analysis.” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 62(2), 318-321. 
Mester, Loretta J., Leonard I. Nakamura, and Micheline Renault (2007). “Transactions accounts 
and Loan Monitoring.” The Review of Financial Studies 20(3), 529-556. 
Nelson, Forrest and Lawrence Olson (1978). “Specification and Estimation of a Simultaneous-
Equation Model with Limited Dependent Variables.” International Economic Review 19(3), 695-
709. 
Newey, Whitney, K. (1987). “Efficient Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with 
Endogenous Explanatory Variables.” Journal of Econometrics 36, 231-250. 
Norden, Lars, and Martin Weber (2010). “Credit Line Usage, Checking Account Activity, and 
Default Risk of Bank Borrowers.” The Review of Financial Studies 23(10), 3665-3699. 
Statistics Canada (2006). “Assets and Debts Held by Family Units, Total Amounts.” Available 
online: http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/famil109-eng.htm. 
Strahan, Philip E. (1999). “Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank loans.” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 90. 
 31 
 
Sufi, Amir (2009). “Bank lines of credit in corporate finance: An empirical analysis.” The 
Review of Financial Studies 22(3), 1057-1088. 
Tufano, Peter (2009). “Consumer Finance”. Annual Review of Financial Economics 1, 227-247. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
 32 
 
Figure 1 
Assets of Canadian Chartered Banks ($ million), 1981-2012 
 
 
 
The figure plots the monthly average value (in $ million) of personal loans, credit cards, and 
credit lines for Canadian Chartered Banks from 1981 to 2012. The data come from the series 
v36867, v36868 and v36869 of CANSIM and do not include information concerning mortgages. 
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Table 1 
List of variables used in the econometric analysis 
Variable Code  Description 
Default probability Def = 
1 if the term loan is in default, 
0 otherwise. 
Credit line utilization Util = 
Value of the credit line drawn on December	31, 2007
Total amount authorized by	the	bank . 
Borrower sex Sex = 
1 if the borrower is male, 
0 otherwise. 
Credit score Score = Internal credit rating given to the client by the bank (1 to 8). 
Seniority Sen = Seniority of the client at the institution (months). 
Employment  Work = 
1 if the borrower is employed, 
0 otherwise. 
Dependents Dep = Number of borrower’s dependents  
Borrower age 
 
Age  
(categories 1 to 6) 
= 
1 if consistent with the category, 
0 otherwise. 
Borrower ability to 
pay 
 
Abil  
(categories 1 to 5) 
= 
1 if consistent with the category, 
0 otherwise. 
Remainder on the loan Rem = Remaining term on the loan, in months. 
Loan collateral Loan_coll = 
1 if the loan is secured by collateral, 
0 otherwise. 
Additional credit lines Lines = Number of additional active credit lines 
Credit line used Used = Amount used on the credit line 
Credit line collateral Line_coll = 
1 if the credit line is secured by collateral, 
0 otherwise. 
Total debt Debt = Borrower’s total debt at the institution or elsewhere 
The table presents the variables, their code, and the definition used in the econometric analysis. The first two 
variables are used as dependent variables in the analysis; the other ones are used as independent variables. 
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Table 2 
Estimates used for predicting expenditures 
Variables   Male Sample   Female Sample 
Intercept   601.44 (0.0001) ***   208.54 (0.0007) *** 
Income   0.6126 (0.0001) **   0.7257 (0.0001) ** 
Dependents   469.97 (0.0001) ***   274.58 (0.0001) *** 
Owner   147.77 (0.0028) **   201.17 (0.0002) *** 
Age 1   33.08   (0.7117)   183.08 (0.0717) * 
Age 2   64.57   (0.3269)   62.57   (0.3269) 
Age 4 -129.91 (0.0323) **   143.76 (0.0213) ** 
Age 5 -151.74 (0.0421) **   286.32 (0.0007) *** 
Age 6 -174.68 (0.2690)  -37.77   (0.7890) 
The table presents the estimates used for predicting the expenditures in the ability-to-pay ratio. The first column 
reports the OLS results for the male sample, while the second column reports the OLS results for the female sample. 
Values in parentheses represent the p-value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the values are zero.  *, **, 
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 3 
Ability-to-pay ratio 
Category Ability to Pay 
Abil 1 Ratio ≤ 0 or Ratio ≥ 1 
Abil 2 0.498 ≤ Ratio < 1 
Abil 3 0.249 ≤ Ratio < 0.498 
Abil 4 0.127 ≤ Ratio < 0.249 
Abil 5 0 < Ratio < 0,127 
The table presents the segmentation used for the ability-to-pay ratio. This ratio is expressed as the monthly payment 
on the loan divided by the sum of income and tangible assets minus the predicted expenditures. A negative value for 
this ratio implies that the expenditures are higher than the income and tangible assets added, while a value of more 
than one implies a monthly payment higher than the client’s ability to pay. Safer borrowers have a small but positive 
ratio (corresponding to the Abil 5 category). 
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Table 4 
Credit Line Probit  
(Heckman selection regression) 
 Credit line indicator variable (Probit Regression ) 
Score -0. 1459 (0.000) *** 
Sen   0.0004 (0.000) *** 
Work   0.1640 (0.000) *** 
Dep   0.0252 (0.053) ** 
Age 1   0. 0341 (0.401)  
Age 2   0. 2073 (0.000) *** 
Age 3   0.2191 (0.000) *** 
Age 4   0.1942 (0.000) *** 
Age 5   0.1515 (0.000) *** 
Sex   0.0845 (0.000) *** 
Debt   0.0028 (0.000) *** 
Intercept -0.2271 (0.000) *** 
 
Observations  34,404 
LR chi2(14) 2375.98 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0506 
The table reports a Probit selection model for borrowers using a line of credit. The dependent variable is a binary 
indicator of borrowers using a revolving line of credit. The results are used to construct the inverse Mill ratio, testing 
for sample bias in the outcome regression (Table 5). Values in parentheses represent the p-value of the test statistic 
for the null hypothesis that the values are zero.  *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 5 
Heckman outcome regressions 
   
 
Credit Line 
Utilization  
(2SLS - Heckman) 
Credit Line 
Utilization  
(2SLS) 
Default  
Probability 
(2SLS - Heckman) 
Default 
Probability  
(2SLS) 
Util     0.0048 (0.201)   0.0045 (0.229) 
Def   5.8350 (0.000) ***   5.9139 (0.000) ***   
Score   0.0341 (0.002) ***    0.0198 (0.019) **   0.0054 (0.000) ***   0.0065 (0.000) *** 
Sen   0. 002 (0.001) ***    0. 002 (0.000) ***    0.0000 (0.662)  0.0000 (0.819) 
Work   0.0132 (0.553)   0.0308 (0.120) -0.0003 (0.924) -0.0017 (0.576) 
Dep   0.0129 (0.205)   0.0163 (0.108) -0.0016 (0.325) -0.0018 (0.242) 
Age 1 -0.0219 (0.528) -0.0232 (0.507)   0.0001 (0.979)   0.0002 (0.967) 
Age 2 -0.0533 (0.095) * -0.0328 (0.260) *   0.0084 (0.078) *   0.0068 (0.119) 
Age 3 -0.0152 (0.638) -0.0069 (0.813)   0.0092 (0.054) *   0.0075 (0.081) * 
Age 4 -0.0465 (0.179) -0.0294 (0.368)   0.0133 (0.006) ***   0.0119 (0.009) *** 
Age 5 -0.0679 (0.043) **  -0.0554 (0.089) *    0.0109 (0.025) **   0.0098 (0.037) ** 
Sex -0.0640 (0.000) *** -0.0560 (0.000) ***   0.0059 (0.004) ***   0.0052 (0.005) *** 
Abil 1   0.1117 (0.000) ***    0.1040 (0.000) ***    0.0092 (0.007) ***   0.0098 (0.003) *** 
Abil 2   0.0979 (0.000) ***    0.0909 (0.000) ***    0.0057 (0.055) *   0.0062 (0.031) ** 
Abil 3   0.0938 (0.000) ***   0.0903 (0.000) *** -0.0019 (0.488) -0.0016 (0.557) 
Abil 4   0.0388 (0.023) **    0.0371 (0.031) **    0.0024 (0.358)   0.0026 (0.332) 
Rem   -0.0001 (0.006) *** -0.0001 (0.004) *** 
Loan_coll   -0.0001 (0.941) -0.0000 (0.992) 
Lines     0.0082 (0.000) ***   0.0081 (0.000) *** 
Line_coll   0.0736 (0.007) ***  0.0746 (0.007) ***   
Used -0.0652 (0.000) *** -0.0655 (0.000) ***   
Intercept   0.2267 (0.371)  0.2267 (0.022) ** -0.0374 (0.006) *** -0.0273 (0.000) *** 
IMR -0.1423 (0.101)             0.0114 (0.409)  
 
Observations    14,767   14,767 14,767 14,767 
Wald chi2(19)   2354.31   2301.61 222.37 221.70 
Prob > chi2   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.0000 
The table reports the coefficients of the second-stages of the 2SLS model when including the inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR). Because the coefficient on the IMR is not statistically significant in either equation, we conclude that there is 
no selection bias in our sample. Values in parentheses represent the p-value of the test statistic for the null 
hypothesis that the values are zero.  *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 6 
Dependent variables 
Panel A: Loan Status Observations Proportion of data 
Default 160   1.08% 
Non-default 14,607 98.92% 
Total 14,767    100% 
 
Panel B: Credit Line Utilization Observations Proportion of data 
0% 4,433 30.02% 
0 % < Credit Line Utilization < 100% 9,693 65.64% 
100% 641 04.34% 
Total 14,767     100% 
Panel A reports the number of observations in the default and non-default states, and their proportion in the data. 
Panel B reports the number of observations for credit line utilization of 0%, between 0% and 100%, and 100%, and 
their proportions in the data. 
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Table 7 
Credit line utilization by loan status 
 Number of observations (proportion in terms of loan status) 
Loan Status 0% utilization 100% utilization 
Default  12      (7.50 %) 62   (38.75 %) 
Non-default  4421 (30.27 %) 579 (3.96 %) 
The table presents the proportion of observations in the default and non-default states for borrowers using 0% and 
100% of their credit line. 
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Table 8 
Explanatory variables 
 Default Group  Non-Default Group  Comparison Tests 
 Mean Median Standard deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation  
Mean 
Comparison  
(T-test) 
Median 
Comparison
(Chi(2)) 
Util 0.78 0.99 0.39  0.45 0.43 0.33  0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Score 4.55 4 1.82  2.88 3 1.68  0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Age 38.94 37 10.84  41.70 42 11.76  0.003 *** 0.023 ** 
Sen 160.45 125 126.58  200.12 180 131.44  0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Dep 0.14  0 0.54  0.17  0 0.56  0.578 0.721 
Sex 0.72 1 0.45  0.67 1 0.47  0.161 ψ 
Work 0.93 1 0.26  0.89 1 0.31  0.201 ψ 
Abil 0 .97 0.38 7.15  0.78 0.25 43. 68  0.952 0.001 *** 
Rem 17.96 19.13 19.132  23.67 19.23 22.62  0.002 *** 0.097 * 
Loan_coll 0.22 0 0.41  0.24 0 0.43  0.5635 0.628 
Lines 0.84 1 0.44  0.82 1 0.48  0.4664 0.885 
The table presents the mean and median of each explanatory variable by the borrower’s loan status, along with a 
mean and median comparison test. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. ψ means that the test statistic is not available. 
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Table 9 
Estimation results 
 (1) Newey’s Two-Step Estimation  (2) Maximum Likelihood Estimation  (3) Two-Stage Probit Least Squares  
 Instrumented Tobit Instrumented Probit  Instrumented Tobit Instrumented Probit  Instrumented OLS Instrumented Probit 
Util    0.4661 (0.005) ***     0.4631 (0.005) ***     0.2802 (0.039) ** 
Def   8.5962 (0.000) *** -    8.6808 (0.000) ***     0.1382 (0.000) ***  
Score   0.0267 (0.029) **   0.1827 (0.000) ***    0.0261 (0.035) **   0.1817 (0.000) ***    0.0318 (0.000) **   0.1804 (0.000) *** 
Sen   0.0003 (0.000) *** -0.0001 (0.784)    0.0003 (0.000) *** -0.0001 (0.783)    0.0002 (0.000) *** -0.0001 (0.839) 
Work   0.0429 (0.136)   0.0293 (0.824)    0.0430 (0.138)   0.0296 (0.820)    0.0180 (0.349)   0.0202 (0.873) 
Dep   0.0221 (0.130) -0.0863  (0.188)    0.0223 (0.131) -0.0858 (0.187)    0.0174 (0.080) * -0.0866 (0.177) 
Age 1 -0.0207 (0.683)   0.2347 (0.256)  -0.0207 (0.686)   0.2329 (0.256)  -0.0527 (0.093) *   0.2257 (0.256) 
Age 2 -0.0391 (0.353)   0.3846 (0.018) **  -0.0398 (0.350)   0.3826 (0.018) **  -0.0428 (0.112)   0.3722 (0.017) ** 
Age 3   0.0157 (0.710)   0.3996 (0.013) **    0.0150 (0.725)   0.3977 (0.013) **  -0.0011 (0.967)   0.3844 (0.013) ** 
Age 4 -0.0370 (0.435)   0.6228 (0.001) ***  -0.0380 (0.427)   0.6197 (0.001) ***  -0.0408 (0.219)   0.5952 (0.001) *** 
Age 5 -0.0851 (0.073) *   0.5740 (0.005) ***  -0.0859 (0.072) *   0.5711 (0.005) ***  -0.0688 (0.044) **   0.5233 (0.009) *** 
Sex -0.0831 (0.000) ***   0.2231 (0.003) ***  -0.0835 (0.000) ***   0.2221 (0.003) ***  -0.0549 (0.000) ***   0.2167 (0.004) *** 
Abil1   0.1470 (0.000) ***   0.3829 (0.003) ***    0.1461 (0.000) ***   0.3809 (0.003) ***    0.1033 (0.000) ***   0.4042 (0.001) *** 
Abil 2   0.1341 (0.000) ***   0.2918 (0.016) **    0.1335 (0.000) ***   0.2904 (0.016) **    0.0825 (0.000) ***   0.3109 (0.009) *** 
Abil 3   0.1373 (0.000) *** -0.0593 (0.657)    0.1374 (0.000) *** -0.0587 (0.659)    0.0831 (0.000) *** -0.0246 (0.850) 
Abil 4   0.0592 (0.018) **   0.1612 (0.191)    0.0589 (0.019) **   0.1605 (0.190)    0.0268 (0.153)    0.1788 (0.136) 
Rem  -0.0058 (0.004) ***   -0.0058 (0.004) ***   -0.0060 (0.002) *** 
Loan_coll  -0.0376 (0.646)   -0.0381 (0.640)   -0.0243 (0.759) 
Lines    0.2652 (0.000) ***     0.2639 (0.000) ***     0.2639 (0.000) *** 
Used   0.0861 (0.000) ***     0.0860 (0.000) ***     0.0648 (0.000) ***  
Line_coll -0.1024 (0.011) **   -0.1028 (0.011) **   -0.0579 (0.011) ***  
Intercept -0.1071 (0.106) -4.1698 (0.000) ***  -0.1050 (0.116) -4.1468 (0.000) ***    0.5046 (0.000) *** -3.9745 (0.000) *** 
 
Observations 14,767 14,767  14,767 14,767  14,767 14,767 
Pseudo R2  - -  - -  0.4364 0.1135 
Wald chi2(df) 1946.21 176.16  1914.82 173.45  - - 
P-value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
The table presents the three sets of instrumented results estimated for the model. The first set of results is estimated with Newey’s Two-Step Efficient Estimator (Newey, 1987), a 
limited information procedure. Standard errors for this estimator are based on Amemiya’s (1978, 1979) derivations of the efficient variance-covariance matrices. The second set of 
results is estimated from a full information maximum likelihood procedure. For robustness, the last set of results is a joint two-step estimation of OLS and Probit models, known as 
Two-Step Probit Least Squares (2SPLS). All procedures are instrumented for the endogenous variables of the system and all results reported are for the second stage estimation. 
Values in parentheses represent the p-value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the values are zero.  *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 10 
Marginal effect coefficients derived from the MLE 
 Credit line utilization  (Instrumented Tobit) 
Default Probability  
(Instrumented Probit ) 
Util    0.4631 (0.005) *** 
Def   0.5887 (0.000) ***  
Score   0.0104 (0.035) **   0.1817 (0.000) *** 
Sen   0.0001 (0.000) *** -0.0001 (0.783) 
Work   0.0171 (0.137)   0.0296 (0.820) 
Dep   0.0089 (0.131) -0.0858 (0.187) 
Age 1 -0.0082 (0.686)   0.2329 (0.256) 
Age 2 -0.0158 (0.349)   0.3826 (0.018) ** 
Age 3   0.0060 (0.725)   0.3977 (0.013) ** 
Age 4 -0.0151 (0.426)   0.6197 (0.001) *** 
Age 5 -0.0340 (0.071) *   0.5711 (0.005) *** 
Sex -0.0333 (0.000) ***   0.2221 (0.003) *** 
Abil 1   0.0583 (0.000) ***   0.3809 (0.003) *** 
Abil 2   0.0533 (0.010) ***   0.2904 (0.016) ** 
Abil 3   0.0548 (0.000) *** -0.0587 (0.659) 
Abil 4   0.0235 (0.002) **   0.1605 (0.190) 
Rem  -0.0058 (0.004) *** 
Loan_coll  -0.0381 (0.640) 
Lines    0.2639 (0.000) *** 
Used   0.0342 (0.000) ***  
Line_coll -0.0406 (0.010) ***  
 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey overid. test   0.289   (0.8654)   1.165 (0.2804) 
Wald test of exogeneity   108.35 (0.000) ***   4.45 (0.0349) ** 
Observations    14,767   14,767 
The table reports the marginal effects of the independent variables derived from the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation. This estimation allows a test of the exogeneity of the default probability and the credit line 
utilization variables by a Wald test of exogeneity. The null hypothesis of the test is the exogeneity of the 
variable. Newey’s Two-Step Efficient Estimation allows a validation of the chosen instruments for each 
endogenous variable by an Amemiya-Lee-Newey overidentification test (Lee, 1992). The null hypothesis of the 
test is the validity of the instruments. Marginal effects reported for the Probit model are based on linear 
prediction. Marginal effects reported for the Tobit model are presented for the latent variable. Values in 
parentheses represent the p-value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the values are zero.  *, **, and 
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 11 
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition 
 Credit line utilization (Tobit) 
 Intensive Margin Extensive Margin 
Def   0.1627 (0.000) *** -0.1910 (0.000) *** 
Score   0.0009 (0.035) **   0.0007 (0.036) ** 
Sen   0.0000 (0.000) ***   0.0000 (0.000) *** 
Work   0.0015 (0.138)   0.0012 (0.184) 
Dep   0.0008 (0.131)   0.0006 (0.133) 
Age 1 -0.0007 (0.686) -0.0006 (0.704) 
Age 2 -0.0014 (0.350) -0.0011 (0.383) 
Age 3   0.0005 (0.725)   0.0004 (0.718) 
Age 4 -0.0013 (0.427) -0.0010 (0.454) 
Age 5 -0.0030 (0.072) * -0.0027 (0.134) 
Sex -0.0029 (0.000) *** -0.0019 (0.000) *** 
Abil 1   0.0052 (0.000) ***   0.0023 (0.000) *** 
Abil 2   0.0047 (0.000) ***   0.0024 (0.000) *** 
Abil 3   0.0048 (0.000) ***   0.0024 (0.000) *** 
Abil 4   0.0021 (0.019) **   0.0013 (0.007) *** 
Used   0.0030 (0.000) ***   0.0022 (0.000) *** 
Line_coll -0.0036 (0.011) ** -0.0035 (0.044) ** 
 
Observations   14,767 14,767 
The table reports the McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition for the Tobit equation of 
credit line utilization based on Equation (5). The intensive margin reports the marginal 
probability of utilization of the credit line for an individual who already has a utilization rate 
between 0% and 100%. The extensive margin reports the marginal utilization of the credit 
line for an individual who has a 0% or 100% utilization of the credit line. Values in 
parentheses represent the p-value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the values are 
zero.  *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
